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THE SMALL LAWS: ELIOT SPITZER AND THE
WAY TO INSURANCE MARKET REFORM
Sean M Fitzpatrick*
"For when you break the great laws, you do not get liberty; you do not
even get anarchy. You get the small laws."
'
INTRODUCTION
In 2004, the property-casualty insurance industry was roiled by a scandal
unparalleled in its history, with the world's largest insurance broker, Marsh
& McLennan, accused of defrauding customers by "rigging bids" to
maximize its own profits. New York State Attorney General Eliot Spitzer's
suit against Marsh in October 2004 was the first salvo in a continuing
challenge to long-established insurance market practices, 2 and has set in
motion a process of regulatory scrutiny and proposed legal reform whose
ends are impossible to predict. Indeed, not since another ambitious New
York governor-to-be, Charles Evans Hughes, cut a swath through the life
insurance industry as chief counsel to the renowned Armstrong
Committee-almost exactly a century ago-has the insurance community
faced so fundamental a challenge to its structure and ethics.3 In a curious
historical twist, that earlier scandal had its genesis in a grand party thrown
* Lecturer in Law, University of Connecticut School of Law; Senior Vice President and
Special Counsel, The Chubb Corporation. In his capacity as Special Counsel at Chubb, Mr.
Fitzpatrick has participated in Chubb's response to Attorney General Eliot Spitzer's
investigation of insurance industry practices and ensuing investigations by other state and
federal regulators. Prior to assuming his current position, Mr. Fitzpatrick was chief
underwriting officer of Chubb's specialty division from 1999 through 2002. In 2005, Mr.
Fitzpatrick also served as president of the Professional Liability Underwriting Society
("PLUS"), the leading trade group in the executive and professional liability insurance
industry. The author is indebted to John Degnan, Tom Baker, David Robinson, and Dino
Robusto for their helpful comments on early drafts of this Article; the opinions expressed are
the author's alone.
1. G.K. Chesterton, Charles Dickens 197 (Schocken Books 1965) (1906).
2. See Complaint, State v. Marsh & McLennan Cos., No. 04403342 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Oct.
14, 2004), available at http://www.oag.state.ny.us/press/2004/oct/octl4a 04 attachl.pdf
[hereinafter Marsh Complaint]
3. See Mark J. Roe, Foundations of Corporate Finance: The 1906 Pacification of the
Insurance Industry, 93 Colum. L. Rev. 639, 656-74 (1993); Adam Winkler, "Other People's
Money ": Corporations, Agency Costs, and Campaign Finance Law, 92 Geo. L.J. 871, 887-
91 (2004). More recent insurance scandals, such as the Lloyd's of London "spiral" in the
1980s, pale in significance beside the challenge posed to the industry by Spitzer's
investigation. See Adam Raphael, Ultimate Risk: The Inside Story of the Lloyd's
Catastrophe (1995).
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in 1905 by the young heir to control of the Equitable Life Assurance
Society, on the site of whose then headquarters-120 Broadway in New
York City-now stands the office of Attorney General Spitzer.4 Regulatory
firestorms such as Mr. Spitzer has unleashed are like Pandora's Box: Once
opened, even their authors are powerless to control their ultimate effects.
And those effects are likely to surprise even the most well-intentioned
regulator. In this particular case, a strong argument can be made that an
industry-wide ban on the contingent compensation structures targeted by
Spitzer would bankrupt hundreds of small insurance agencies in
communities throughout America, and lead to the further consolidation of
insurance brokerage business in large global firms like Marsh. Insurance is
an old-fashioned, surprisingly risk-averse industry. Its fundamental
practices have changed little for generations. Indeed, the state of affairs that
first drew Attorney General Spitzer's attention-large commercial
insurance brokers allegedly manipulating the market for their own benefit-
was the result of nothing so much as the coupling of -time-honored sales
incentive practices developed on Main Street, U.S.A. with an
unprecedented level of market power attained by a few global megafirms
following a consolidation spree in the 1990s. 5 But it would be an expensive
mistake to jump from that observation to the conclusion that all contingent
compensation of all insurance producers is necessarily harmful to insurance
consumers.
Part I of this Article traces the history of Attorney General Spitzer's
investigation into insurance industry practices (the "Spitzer Investigation").
Part II offers an overview of the property-casualty insurance market as it
has evolved in the United States and discusses the pros and cons of
traditional insurance producer compensation practices. 6 Part III describes
regulatory and legislative responses to the Spitzer Investigation, largely
focused in interstate organizations such as the National Association of
Insurance Commissioners and the National Conference of Insurance
4. See Patricia Beard, After the Ball: Gilded Age Secrets, Boardroom Betrayals, and
the Party that Ignited the Great Wall Street Scandal of 2005, at 14 (Perennial ed. 2004).
5. Among the many ironies of the current investigations-which include a substantial
focus on threats to competition in the insurance market-is the fact that the consolidation of
more than sixty percent of the global insurance brokerage market for large corporate risks
into three megafirms occurred in the 1990s without so much as a peep from federal or state
antitrust authorities. See Oversight Hearing on Insurance Brokerage Practices, Including
Potential Conflicts of Interest and the Adequacy of the Current Regulatory Framework:
Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Financial Management, the Budget, and International
Security, Comm. on Governmental Affairs, 108th Cong. 55 (2004) (statement of Eliot
Spitzer, State of New York Attorney General), available at
http://www.oag.state.ny.us/press/statements/insurance-investigation-testimony.pdf
[hereinafter U.S. Senate Testimony].
6. Although Attorney General Spitzer and other regulators have also launched
investigations into practices in the market for health and employee benefits insurance, see,
e.g., Press Release, Office of N.Y. State Attorney Gen. Eliot Spitzer, Life, Disability Broker
Charged with Fraud, Antitrust Violations (Nov. 12, 2004), available at
http://www.oag.state.ny.us./press/2004/nov/nov12a_04.html, this Article will focus on the
property-casualty insurance market.
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Legislators. Finally, Part IV sets forth the author's suggestions for a
simple, voluntary reform that would increase transparency for insurance
consumers while avoiding the pitfalls likely to attend more draconian
solutions.
I. THE SPITZER INVESTIGATION
The Spitzer Investigation began without fanfare on February 10, 2004,
when the Washington Legal Foundation ("WLF"), a free-market-oriented
advocacy organization, sent a letter to the state insurance commissioners
and attorneys general of New York and California. In its letter, the WLF
voiced concerns with "two potentially damaging practices engaged in by
some in the insurance brokerage industry": 7 namely, the use of "placement
service agreements" by brokers to obtain additional compensation from
insurers based on the volume of business placed with them and the alleged
"leveraging" by brokers of primary insurance production "to procure an
insurance company's highly lucrative reinsurance [placement] business." 8
While the WLF letter focused on so-called placement service agreements
("PSAs")-a usage coined by Marsh and not widely used elsewhere in the
insurance industry-the thrust of the WLF's complaint was that so-called
''contingent commissions" paid by insurers to brokers based on the brokers'
achievement of premium volume and profitability goals "can compromise
the broker's fiduciary duty to represent the best interests of their clients, and
create incentives for brokers to refer business to companies that will make
them more money." 9 Similarly, the WLF argued that a broker's leveraging
of its ability to refer primary insurance business to obtain reinsurance
brokerage engagements from insurers could lead to a similar conflict of
interest. 10
In their typical form, "contingent commissions" are payments made by
an insurer to an insurance agency or brokerage for success in achieving
stipulated levels of premium volume and profitability on its overall book of
business with that carrier." Such payments are in addition to the "standard
commissions"-typically ranging from ten to twenty percent of the total
7. Letter from Daniel J. Popeo, Chairman and Gen. Counsel, Washington Legal
Found., to Gregory V. Serio, N.Y. State Superintendent of Ins. (Feb. 10, 2004) (on file with
author) [hereinafter WLF Letter]. The Washington Legal Foundation ("WLF") letter
credited a December 2003 article by John Dizard of the Financial Times as prompting its
interest in these issues, see John Dizard, With Brokers like These Who Needs Enemies?, Fin.
Times, Dec. 15, 2003, at 27, although it also made note of a January 2004 J.P. Morgan
Securities analyst report that focused on the significance of contingent commissions in the
overall compensation of large brokers, see Hugh Warns et al., J.P. Morgan Sec., Insurance-
Non-life: Contingents May Be Smaller, But More Prominent in 2004 (2004), available at
http://www.cdfe.org/jpm%20cont%20comm%201041 .pdf.
8. WLF Letter, supra note 7, at 2.
9. Id. at 1.
10. Id. at 2-3.
11. See J. David Cummins & Neil A. Doherty, The Economics of Insurance
Intermediaries 2 (2005), available at
http://www.insurancejournal.com/downloadsiWhartonStudy_2005.05.20.pdf.
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policy premium-that are paid by the carrier on each discrete insurance
transaction. Marsh's innovation, developed in the late 1990s, was a
"Placement Service Agreement" that ostensibly compensated the broker
based on services provided to the insurer and was calculated based on
premium volume alone, without regard to the ultimate profitability of the
business produced by Marsh. A few other large brokers adopted the PSA
terminology, sometimes as an acronym for "Profit Sharing Agreement," but
profitability remained a component of most non-Marsh PSAs.12
Interestingly, in view of what followed, the WLF's concern was limited
to conflicts involving insurance brokers, who "are paid to advocate for their
customers, not themselves, and certainly not for the insurance companies
with whom they place their business."'13 The WLF did not address the more
complicated issue of independent insurance agents, intermediaries who are
contractually bound to represent the interests of insurance carriers that
appoint them.' 4 As I discuss in the next section, intermediaries operating
solely as true "brokers" are relatively rare in the United States, and tend to
be centered in certain geographic areas, most notably New York City and
San Francisco, whose insurance markets developed from maritime roots
and not surprisingly borrowed their structure from the original "broker
market," Lloyd's of London. Elsewhere in the United States, the demands
of distance led to the development of an "agency system" whereby
intermediaries were empowered to act on behalf of one or more insurers in
performing functions not permitted to true brokers, such as binding and
issuing policies. 15 Independent insurance agents continue to place the bulk
of property-casualty policies in this country.
16
12. In 2004, as questions about contingent commissions arose, Marsh and its largest
competitor, Aon Corporation, briefly adopted the term "Market Service Agreement" or
"MSA" to describe their contingent commission agreements with carriers, but this
nomenclature was never adopted by the industry at large.
13. WLF Letter, supra note 7, at 3. In fact, contingent compensation paid to brokers had
been subjected to regulatory scrutiny by New York State as recently as 1998, when the
state's Department of Insurance issued a Circular Letter requiring brokers to disclose
contingent commissions to their clients. See N.Y.S. Dept. of Ins., Circular Letter No. 22
(Aug. 25, 1998).
14. See 7 Eric Mills Holmes, Holmes' Appleman on Insurance 2d: Law of Insurance
Agents § 47.5, 326 (1998) ("Bluntly stated, an 'insurance agent' represents the insurance
company, whereas an 'insurance broker' represents the insured, although the question
whether one is an insurance agent or broker is a question dependent on the particular facts."
(footnotes omitted)); Int'l Risk Mgmt. Inst., Professional Liability Insurance, at XV.C.I
(2003) [hereinafter IRMI] ("Traditionally, the difference between insurance agents and
brokers is that agents are considered representatives of insurance companies while brokers
are thought of legally as representatives of insureds."); Sean M. Fitzpatrick, Fear Is the Key:
A Behavioral Guide to Underwriting Cycles, 10 Conn. Ins. L.J. 255, 269 n.47 (2004); see
also Krumme v. Mercury Ins. Co., 20 Cal. Rptr. 3d 485, 488-90 (Cal. Ct. App. 2004)
(discussing the broker-agent distinction under California law). For purposes of this Article,
the terms "producer" and "intermediary" will be used to describe both brokers and agents.
15. See generally Holmes, supra note 14, §§ 44.1-.7.
16. See, e.g., Cummins & Doherty, supra note 11, at 8; IRMI, supra note 14, at XV.C.5;
see also Owens v. Aetna Life & Cas. Co., 654 F.2d 218, 240 (3d Cir. 1981).
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Spitzer's interest in potential abuses in the insurance industry was further
whetted by an anonymous letter received by his office on March 30, 2004.
The letter, postmarked from a New York suburb and signed only
"Concerned," made damning allegations about Marsh's PSAs, asserting,
"The point is to appear as if Marsh is providing a service to the insurance
market rather than the reality which is that Marsh is receiving major income
for directing business to preferred providers/insurance markets."'
17
Spitzer's office reportedly issued a subpoena to Marsh within three days of
receiving this corroboration of the WLF's allegations.18
The Spitzer Investigation became public on April 22, 2004, when Aon,
the world's second-largest insurance broker, reported that it had received a
subpoena from Spitzer's office inquiring about its acceptance of contingent
commissions from insurers. 19 Soon thereafter, Marsh and Willis Group
Holdings, the world's third largest broker, reported receiving similar
subpoenas. 20 Within a month, Spitzer's office had broadened its probe to
include insurance companies as well as brokers, issuing a number of
subpoenas to large property-casualty insurers.2 1
The New York Attorney General broadened his investigation into two
additional areas in mid-2004. In a second round of subpoenas issued to
insurance carriers in August 2004, the Attorney General's office first sought
information regarding insurers' compensation arrangements with
independent insurance agents, as opposed to brokers. 22 At the same time,
documents were requested concerning the second alleged source of
insurance market distortion raised by the WLF-the "tying" by an
insurance intermediary of retail business production to an insurance
17. See Steve Fishman, Inside Eliot's Army, N.Y. Mag., Jan. 10, 2005, available at
http://www.newyorkmetro.com/nymetro/news/politics/newyork/features/10815/index.html;
see also Peter Elkind, Spitzer's Crusade, Fortune, Nov. 15, 2004, at 130.
18. Fishman, supra note 17.
19. Press Release, Aon Corp., State of New York Seeks Information Regarding
Compensation Agreements Between Insurance Brokers and Insurance Companies (Apr. 22,
2004), available at http://www.aon.com/about/news/pressrelease/pr000100C7.jsp.
20. David K. Bradford, Advisen, Placement Service Agreements: Big Brokers Under
Fire 1 (2004); see also Gretchen Morgenson, Hat Trick. A 3Pd Unit of Marsh Under Fire,
N.Y. Times, May 2, 2004, § 3, at 9. At least one smaller New York City broker, Kaye
Associates (a subsidiary of Hub International), was also subpoenaed in this first wave. Id.
California Insurance Commissioner John Garamendi was the first regulator outside New
York State to follow Spitzer's lead in announcing his own investigation. Joseph B. Treaster,
An Inquiry into Insurance Payments and Conflicts, N.Y. Times, Apr. 28, 2004, at Cl.
Others would follow; at this writing more than twenty other states have initiated
investigations of insurance market conduct.
21. Joseph B. Treaster, Inquiry Widens; Insurance Brokers May Face Change, N.Y.
Times, May 18, 2004, at Cl. The author's employer, Chubb Corporation, was among the
insurance companies subpoenaed by Attorney General Spitzer's office. See Press Release,
The Chubb Corp., Chubb to Comply with Subpoena Regarding Broker Compensation (May
17, 2004), available at http://www.chubb.com/marketing/chubbl824.html.
22. A sample subpoena is on file with the author.
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carrier's willingness to retain that intermediary's reinsurance brokerage
affiliate to place its reinsurance. 23
Perhaps the most fateful day in determining the ultimate course of the
Spitzer Investigation was September 9, 2004, when a New York University
law student working as an intern in Spitzer's office unearthed an e-mail
indicating that Marsh had conspired with insurance carriers to rig bids on
insurance renewals: obtaining false, inflated quotes from complicit markets
to enable Marsh to direct business to a chosen market with an eye toward
maximizing its PSA payments. 24 The quid pro quo for such cooperation
from the "losing" markets would be protection by Marsh on its own
renewals through similar means. This evidence of outright fraud and
market manipulation provided the catalyst that enabled Spitzer's staff to
crystallize a more unfocused discomfort with insurance market sales
incentives (including contingent commissions, loans to producers, funding
of producers' sales staffs, leveraging reinsurance broking engagements,
etc.) into a broader challenge of disclosure practices in the property and
casualty ("P&C") market.
This challenge manifested on October 14, 2004, when Spitzer filed suit
against Marsh. 25 The thrust of Spitzer's complaint was two-fold. First, he
alleged that Marsh's practice of accepting contingent commissions led the
broker to elevate its own interests above those of its clients, by "steering"
business to carriers based more on the economics of Marsh's PSAs than on
the needs of the customer. 26 Second, Spitzer alleged several instances of
outright bid rigging by Marsh in the Excess Casualty insurance market,
23. See WLF Letter, supra note 7, at 2-3. The Attorney General issued a more
comprehensive round of subpoenas focused on reinsurance tying allegations in October
2004. Whereas Spitzer's investigation of alleged abuses related to placement service
agreements ("PSAs") focused largely on activities at Marsh, this facet of his investigation
appeared to focus primarily on business practices at Aon. See Timothy L. O'Brien & Joseph
B. Treaster, Spitzer Goes Hunting for His Next Trophy, N.Y. Times, Oct. 31, 2004, § 3, at 1.
24. Kate Kelly, In Spitzer's Office, Hours of Drudgery, Moments of 'Gotcha!', Wall St.
J., Oct. 27, 2004, at Al.
25. See Marsh Complaint, supra note 2.
26. Id. 7-8, 14-42. In an amusing footnote to this story, Spitzer was embarrassed in
April 2005 when Reuters reported that his gubernatorial campaign had paid the Google
search engine firm to direct users searching the term "AIG"--an insurance company then
under intensive investigation by Spitzer's office-to a link to the "Spitzer for NY Governor"
campaign website, which featured the message: "Good Guys Can Finish First. Sign up Now
to Join the Fight!" NY's Spitzer Gubernatorial Campaign Goes to Google, Reuters, Apr. 6,
2005 (on file with author, together with screen capture of link as it appeared). Within hours
of the Reuters report, the link had been removed and Spitzer's spokesman had publicly
disavowed the "relatively low-level campaign staffer" responsible. See Spitzer Pulls
Campaign Ad Off Google AIG Link, Reuters, Apr. 6, 2005 (on file with author). To his
credit, Attorney General Spitzer quickly renounced this campaign device, no doubt
appreciating the irony that his hapless staffer's Google gambit had in effect caused his
campaign to make an undisclosed payment to an intermediary for the purpose of steering
consumers of information services to its website.
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involving collusion with a number of major insurers.27 On the same day he
filed his complaint against Marsh, Spitzer underscored the seriousness of
his allegations by announcing guilty pleas by two employees of insurer
American International Group ("AIG"), who admitted to participating in
criminal bid rigging.28
It would eventually become clear that, while Spitzer had discovered a
serious problem in one niche of the market, outright bid-rigging behavior
appears to have been limited to the excess casualty sector, where the
combination of a commoditized product and a highly concentrated
brokerage market created conditions ripe for abuse. But, even if we accept
that the bid rigging admittedly conspired in by a number of Marsh
employees (as well as underwriters at several major insurance companies)
was an aberration, how do we account for it? Why would executives at
Marsh risk the professional reputation of the firm, as well as the loss of
substantial clients and the long-term income stream they represented, in
return for the transient benefit of achieving any one year's PSA payment
from a particular insurer? From Marsh's standpoint, the answer lies in the
unfortunate way the broker apparently structured its profit centers, and the
perverse incentives that flowed from that structure. By setting up its Global
Broking division so that its sole source of income was PSA payments from
carriers, and by assigning internal "credit" for the normal income derived
from standard commissions to a separate Client Advisory division, Marsh
all but guaranteed that its employees in Global Broking would elevate the
maximization of PSA payments over all other considerations, including the
long-term reputation and even financial well-being of the firm. As I
discussed at length in an earlier article on the insurance underwriting cycle,
insurance professionals respond to the incentives provided them, and many
of the "problems" the insurance industry contends with-from "boom" and
"bust" market cycles to the recent bid-rigging scandals-can be traced
fairly directly to ill-conceived compensation structures.29
Other commentators, notably Professor John Coffee, have also observed
that even a firm whose very value derives from the trust of the marketplace
in its integrity can unwittingly place its franchise at risk by creating a
bureaucratic culture where profit centers have powerful short-term
economic interests that are inconsistent with the firm's long-term interests,
27. Marsh Complaint, supra note 2, 43-66. Excess Casualty is a type of multi-peril
liability insurance that sits in excess of more specific primary liability policies; it is a highly
commoditized product available from many insurance carriers.
28. Press Release, Office of N.Y. State Attorney Gen. Eliot Spitzer, Investigation
Reveals Widespread Corruption in Insurance Industry (Oct. 14, 2004), available at
http://www.oag.state.ny.us/press/2004/oct/octl4a_04.html; Matthew Goldstein, Spitzer
Charges Marsh & McLennan in Insurance Racket, The Street.com, Oct. 15, 2004,
http://www.thestreet.com/markets/matthewgoldstein/10187969.html. Additional guilty pleas
followed in the ensuing months. At this writing, a total of seventeen individuals had pled
guilty to participation in bid rigging, and eight more were under indictment. Press Release,
Office of N.Y. Attorney Gen. Eliot Spitzer, Insurance Execs Indicted for Bid-Rigging, Fraud
(Sept. 15, 2005), available at http://www.oag.state.ny.us/press/2005/sep/sep l 5a 05.html.
29. See generally Fitzpatrick, supra note 14.
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and where the necessary internal and external controls to manage such an
institutional tension are lacking.30 Coffee also astutely points out that this
risk is exacerbated where, as in the large broker market, a limited number of
competitors reduces the risk that questionable practices will be "outed" by
marketplace rivals. 31 Marsh should, perhaps, have seen warning signs-
friction between its Global Broking and Client Advisory arms was an open
secret in the P&C industry-but beyond reportedly trying to adjust the
incentives of its client advisors to gain their buy-in to the Global Broking
business model, 32 Marsh plainly did not do enough to safeguard against the
risks of that model. Indeed, given the incentives provided and the absence
of necessary countermeasures, it speaks well of Marsh's employees outside
the Excess Casualty area that they apparently did not succumb to the
temptation to game Marsh's compensation system at the expense of its
clients.
But what of the underwriters who conspired with employees of Marsh
Global Broking in rigging bids? Were they so driven to meet premium
production goals that they became blind to the fundamental wrongness of
their conduct? While this is possible, I suspect the real answer is more
subtle, and lies in the way that ethical and cultural norms are communicated
within the insurance industry. Insurance is an industry without an
established, written set of rules governing business practices (unlike, for
example, law or accounting). New initiates to the insurance business
typically receive their training in an informal way, from more senior
employees, and there is a tendency in the industry to accept business
practices of long standing at face value, without examining their ethical
implications. The structure of the insurance market-with intermediaries
acting as the gatekeepers of new business opportunities-also creates some
confusion among underwriters as to whom precisely their "customer" is:
the producer they must please in order to sell policies or the end user of
those policies. Taken together, these influences make it sadly likely that at
least some of the underwriters who have pled guilty to providing fictitious
quotes to Marsh never thought of their behavior as unethical, let alone
criminal. Rather, they probably provided such quotes when asked after
being told "this is just how it's done," well aware, as they no doubt were, of
the importance of maintaining good relations with the world's largest
insurance producer. Again, the surprising thing may be not that bid rigging
occurred among a small number of players in the excess casualty insurance
30. See John C. Coffee, Jr., Understanding Enron: "It's About the Gatekeepers,
Stupid", 57 Bus. Law. 1403, 1409-16 (2002). It is worth noting in this context that another
potential check on broker misbehavior-regular customer contact with their insurers-was
absent to a unique degree in the Excess Casualty market. Excess Casualty is a product
involving infrequent claims, and requires neither the regular servicing of traditional
insurance products like property insurance, nor the in-depth annual underwriting process
(often involving face-to-face meetings with underwriters) typical of complex casualty lines
such as directors' and officers' liability insurance.
31. Id. at 1414-15.
32. Marsh Complaint, supra note 2, 39.
3048 [Vol. 74
THE SMALL LA WS
market, but that similar practices did not develop in other sectors of the
P&C market where limited intermediary channels, a commoditized product,
and dangerous financial incentives also existed.
In any event, Spitzer's combination of a broad-based attack on contingent
commissions, long a familiar and public feature of the insurance market,33
with an indictment of outright fraud in the form of bid rigging, was neatly
done. And, while some commentators pointed out the questionable logic of
meting out equal condemnation to the two very different practices, 34 the
distinction was largely overlooked in the media barrage that followed
Spitzer's filing against Marsh. The term "kickback" was almost uniformly
adopted in press accounts of the Marsh Complaint and even in regulatory
pronouncements from other states,35 notwithstanding the New York
Attorney General's own initial reluctance to use the term.36
Throughout late 2004 and early 2005, however, Spitzer sent conflicting
signals as to how he viewed contingent commissions in and of themselves,
untainted by association with bid rigging or other types of fraud. One could
infer from the Marsh Complaint that Spitzer believed such payments were
inevitably corrupting of the insurance market. At other times, however, the
Attorney General has expressly stated that his concern is not with
contingent commissions per se, but rather with inadequate disclosure to
customers of such payments. In a speech to the National Press Club on
January 31, 2005, for example, Spitzer acknowledged that, while the way
contingent commissions were used by mega-brokers such as Marsh was
wrong, "in other parts of the industry, they may be appropriate. '37 "There
33. Indeed, some of the most vocal critics of contingent commissions as "kickbacks"
have overlooked the fact that their evidence was provided by the insurers themselves, who
publicly report on contingent commissions paid in their annual statutory statements filed
with each state's insurance department. See, e.g., J. Robert Hunter, Consumer Fed'n of Am.,
Contingent Insurance Commissions: Implications for Consumers 2 (2005), available at
http://64.233.179.104/search?q=cache:ihRWPXhE5t0J:www.consumerfed.org/.
34. See, e.g., Eliot's Insurance Policy, Wall St. J., Oct. 21, 2004, at A18; Henry G.
Manne, Regulation 'In Terrorem, 'Wall St. J., Nov. 22, 2004, at A14.
35. See, e.g., Theo Francis, Spitzer Charges Bid Rigging in Insurance, Wall St. J., Oct.
15, 2004, at Al; see also U.S. Senate Testimony, supra note 5, at 2; Press Release, Cal.
Dep't of Ins., Insurance Commissioner John Garamendi Sues Broker and 4 Major Insurers
over Secret Commissions and Kickback Schemes that Netted "Millions of Dollars" (Nov. 28,
2004), available at http://www.insurance.ca.gov/0400-news/0 1 00-press-releases/0090-
2004/release095-04.cfm.
36. Earlier in his investigation, Attorney General Spitzer had been reluctant to use the
word "kickback" in describing contingent commissions. See Interview with Eliot Spitzer
(WXXI-Rochester, NY radio broadcast May 28, 2004) (transcript available at
http://www.wxxi.org/ntk/Transcripts/2004/0528.html). But, despite eschewing the term in
the Marsh Complaint itself, Spitzer had adopted the media's popular term by the time of his
November 2004 U.S. Senate testimony. Of course, as recounted above, his office had
discovered Marsh's bid rigging in the interim.
37. Press Release, Nat'l Assoc. of Prof I Ins. Agents, PIA National Encouraged by
Remarks Made by NY Attorney General Eliot Spitzer on Contingent Commissions (Jan. 31,
2005), available at http://www.pianet.com/NewsCenter/PressReleases/1-31-05.htm. A
recording of Spitzer's entire January 31, 2005, National Press Club speech is available at
http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyld=4472927 (last visited Apr. 17, 2006).
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might be other contexts," he added, "where contingent agreements might
not usurp decision-making and fiduciary duty."'38
In any event, Spitzer's filing of the Marsh Complaint set off a nationwide
wave of investigations, and regulatory and legislative initiatives to reform
insurance brokerage practices. 39  Spitzer's subsequent $850 million
settlement with Marsh, announced in January 2005 on the same day as his
National Press Club speech, lent credence and momentum to these
investigations. 40
The New York Attorney General retained the initiative even as other
regulators joined the fray, issuing new rounds of subpoenas focused on (1)
allegations of a conspiracy among lawyers' malpractice insurers to boycott
plaintiffs' class action law firms, 41 and (2) "finite risk" and other
"nontraditional" insurance products allegedly utilized by some companies
to manipulate their financial results.42 The latter of these prompted the U.S.
Securities and Exchange Commission to begin its own investigation,
following up on its earlier enforcement actions against insurance industry
giant AIG regarding finite risk products it had sold with a broad
investigation paralleling Spitzer's. Spitzer's office also broadened its focus
from contingent commission arrangements to other financial dealings
between insurers and producers, including insurer funding of individual
producer's salaries and incentives to limit marketing of renewals. These
facets of the Spitzer investigation gained prominence when the Attorney
General simultaneously sued Aon and announced a $190 million settlement
38. Spitzer: All Marsh Funds to Go to Insureds; Not All Insurance People or
Contingencies are 'Bad,' Insurance Journal, Jan. 31, 2005,
http://www.insurancejournal.com/news/nationalU2005/0 1/31/50488.htm.
39. At this writing, more than twenty states have initiated formal investigations into
insurance market conduct. Both the National Conference of Insurance Commissioners
("NAIC") and National Conference of Insurance Legislators ("NCOIL") have promulgated
model legislation directed at disclosure to consumers of insurance producer compensation.
See infra Part III. Spitzer himself extended his investigation of contingent commissions and
bid rigging into the health insurance market in November 2004, with a suit against a leading
health and benefits broker, Universal Life Resources. See Press Release, Office of N.Y. State
Attorney Gen. Eliot Spitzer, Life, Disability Broker Charged with Fraud, Antitrust
Violations (Nov. 12, 2004), available at
http://www.oag.state.ny.us/press/2004/nov/novl2a_04.html.
40. See Press Release, Office of N.Y. State Attorney Gen. Eliot Spitzer, Insurance
Broker Agrees to Sweeping Reforms: Marsh to Pay $850 Million in Restitution and Ban
Contingent Commissions (Jan. 31, 2005), available at
http://www.oag.state.ny.us/press/2005/j an/marshsettlement pr.pdf.
41. See Press Release, The St. Paul Travelers Cos., St. Paul Travelers Receives
Subpoena Relating to Lawyers' Professional Liability Insurance (Dec. 10, 2004), available
at http://investor.stpaultravelers.com/phoenix.zhtml?c= 177842&p=irol-
newsArticle&ID=653573&highlight=; Insurers Subpoenaed Over Lawyer Liability
Coverage, http:/Iblogs.advisen.com/blojsom/blog/default/LPL%20Controversy%2ONews/
(Dec. 14, 2004, 09:39 EST).
42. See Gretchen Morgenson, Next Up for Spitzer: Funny Numbers, N.Y. Times, Nov.
21, 2004, § 3, at 1. These inquiries, while raising fascinating questions in and of themselves,
are beyond the scope of this Article.
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with the brokerage firm in March 2005. 4 3 In April 2005, Spitzer reached a
similar $50 million settlement with the number three broker, Willis.44
Marsh, Aon, and Willis each agreed to essentially the same set of "business
reforms" as part of their settlements; chief among these was a ban on their
acceptance of contingent commissions and other forms of incentive
compensation from insurers. 45
It is not yet clear whether Attorney General Spitzer intends to press this
reform on smaller producers, including independent agents, although his
remarks at the National Press Club indicate that he may stop short of doing
so.
4 6 If he does hesitate, what potential consequences of such an outright
43. See Press Release, Office of N.Y. State Attorney Gen. Eliot Spitzer, Aon Settles
Corruption Probe: Leading Insurance Broker Agrees to Pay $190 Million and Adopt
Sweeping Reforms (Mar. 4, 2005), available at
http://www.oag.state.ny.us/press/2005/mar/marO4a_05.html.
44. See Press Release, Office of N.Y. State Attorney Gen. Eliot Spitzer, State Settles
Probe of Willis: Third-Largest Insurance Broker to Pay $50 Million and Adopt Reforms
(Apr. 8, 2005), available at http://www.oag.state.ny.us/press/2005/apr/aprO8b_05.html. Aon
and Willis had forsworn accepting contingent commissions almost immediately following
Spitzer's suit against Marsh. See Press Release, Aon Corp., Aon Eliminates Contingent
Commissions; CEO Calls for New Approach (Oct. 22, 2004), available at
http://www.aon.com/about/news/press-release/pr_0079D39E.jsp; Press Release, Willis
Group Holdings, Willis Group Holdings to End Practice of Contingency Agreements with
Insurance Carriers (Oct. 21, 2004), available at
http://www.willis.com/news/newsattachments/endContingency.pdf. Several other large
brokerage firms followed suit in the weeks that followed. See, e.g., Press Release, Arthur J.
Gallagher & Co., Arthur J. Gallagher & Co. Announces Subpoena from Connecticut
Attorney General, Elimination of Volume & Profit Based Contingent Commissions, and
Third Quarter 2004 Financial Results (Oct. 26, 2004), available at http://media.corporate-
ir.net/media files/irol/10/1041 11/AJGQ3_2004_Earnings Release.pdf.
45. The "business reforms" agreed to by Marsh, Aon, and Willis include the following:
written disclosure and client acknowledgement of standard fee or commission arrangements;
prohibition of contingent commissions; prohibition of any "pay to play" charges to insurers;
prohibition of "bid-rigging" arrangements; prohibition of reinsurance brokerage
"leveraging"; prohibition of inappropriate use of wholesalers (i.e., running placements
through affiliated Wholesale brokers to generate additional commissions); mandatory
disclosure to clients of all insurance quotes procured and related compensation; and
implementation of written standards of conduct and ethics training. The full texts of the
Marsh, Aon, and Willis settlement agreements are available on Attorney General Spitzer's
web site at http://www.oag.state.ny.us/press/agpress05.html (last visited Apr. 17, 2006).
46. David Brown, the chief of Spitzer's investor protection bureau, has taken a more
aggressive public stance, noting, "[1]t'll be interesting to see if the smaller operators reform
themselves. If they don't, maybe we'll have a more extended inquiry on our hands." Elkind,
supra note 17, at 134. As recently as October 2005, some in Spitzer's office were remarking
that "we're only in the fourth inning ... [; t]here's been very little resolution and there's no
plan to walk away from this." Ellen Kelleher & Andrea Felsted, A Year on, Spitzer Keeps up
the Pressure, Fin. Times, Oct. 14, 2005, at 28. As this Article went to press, Attorney
General Spitzer provided additional insights into his approach to the general issue of
contingent commissions when, on February 9, 2006, he announced a $1.6 billion settlement
with AIG that resolved, inter alia, allegations of bid rigging and abusive contingent
commission practices by that firm. See Press Release, Office of N.Y. State Attorney Gen.
Eliot Spitzer, AIG Settles Fraud, Bid-Rigging and Improper Accounting Charges (Feb. 9,
2006), available at http://www.oag.state.ny.us/press/2006/feb/febO9a_06.html. In the
settlement agreement, Spitzer exacted AIG's agreement to support legislation banning
contingent compensation outright (an unlikely outcome, as discussed in Part III, infra) and,
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ban should concern him? Recalling Chesterton's observation, does the fact
that some participants in the insurance market broke certain "great laws"
(the Eighth and Tenth Commandments come to mind47) leave us no
recourse but a fifty-state patchwork of new producer compensation and
disclosure regulations, "small laws" that may disrupt the fundamental
economics of the insurance industry? If this prospect is unappealing, what
alternatives are available to curb insurance market abuses that will not
threaten lasting damage to a vital sector of the economy?
But before we reach these questions, it will be helpful to describe the
U.S. property and casualty insurance market as it had evolved prior to the
Spitzer Investigation, and to consider the economics of that market.
II. THE INSURANCE MARKET AND CONTINGENT COMMISSIONS
To trace the origins of the modern U.S. insurance market, we must begin
at Edward Lloyd's famous coffee house in seventeenth-century London.
Brokers first appeared in this market as a convenient mechanism for
communication among the risk takers, or "underwriters," who collectively
insured individual ships and cargoes.48 This system of intermediaries
permitted providers of capital to the insurance market to transact business
with each other and with purchasers of insurance efficiently, sparing each
underwriter the expense of maintaining its own staff of "office keepers."
Business at Lloyd's was conducted, much as it is today, within the tight
more interestingly, its agreement to forswear contingent commissions in any line of
insurance where the Attorney General could demonstrate based on industry data that the
insurance companies collectively writing sixty-five percent or more of the premium volume
either did not pay contingents or had agreed to abide by the same commitment as AIG. See
Agreement Between the Attorney General of the State of New York and American
International Group, Inc. and its subsidiaries (collectively, "AIG") dated January 18, 2006,
available at http://www.oag.state.ny.us/press/2006/feb/signedSettlement.pdf. Attorney
General Spitzer will presumably utilize his prosecutorial leverage to encourage competitors
of AIG in various insurance lines to agree to similar terms in the coming months, but it
remains to be seen whether the sixty-five percent threshold stipulated will be practically
attainable in any substantial segment of the widely fragmented property and casualty
("P&C") market. In any event, this mechanism demonstrates both Attorney General
Spitzer's view that the insurance market would be a fairer playing field without contingent
commissions and his recognition that no single insurer can "unilaterally disarm" in this area.
Of course, it also implies that Spitzer realizes he will need to continue to seek reform
through investigatory pressure on individual companies, given the low probability of
sweeping legislative or regulatory reform in this area.
47. The Eighth Commandment is "Thou shalt not steal"; the Tenth Commandment is
"Thou shalt not covet thy neighbor's [goods]." See Exodus 20:15, 20:17 (King James). My
fellow Roman Catholics will, of course, recognize the former as the Seventh Commandment,
but-as our story is about to turn to London-I will defer to our Anglican forebears in this
respect.
48. Raphael, supra note 3, at 33-36. Amusingly, in light of our current subject, Adam
Raphael points out that early brokers at Lloyd's adopted the euphemism "office keepers,
broking being regarded as disreputable." Id. at 35. Insurance itself, of course, has even older
roots, dating from at least as far back as the eighteenth century B.C.E., when an early form
of marine insurance known as "bottomry" was enshrined in the Code of Hammurabi in
ancient Babylonia. See Peter L. Bernstein, Against the Gods: The Remarkable Story of Risk
92-95 (1996).
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confines of a small physical marketplace. Initially, underwriters could
personally oversee all aspects of their insurance transaction and, as the
number of participants in the market grew, "syndicates" of capital
providers, or "names," were formed. These syndicates would choose one
among their number to serve as the "active underwriter" for the group, and
these active underwriters carried on the business for centuries thereafter on
much the same personal basis that their forebears had.49 In this system,
brokers were accorded a distinct role within the Lloyd's constitution, as
presenters of business opportunities without underwriting authority.50
Interestingly, in this same period, the underwriters at Lloyd's employed a
distinct, worldwide network of "Lloyd's agents" to provide reports from,
and represent their interests in, remote locations. 51 By 1880, there were
more than 1000 Lloyd's agents around the world, whose authority extended
to the approval of claims payments. 52  The transplantation to and
subsequent development of this system in the United States laid the seeds of
the most challenging puzzle now facing Attorney General Spitzer.
A. Brokers and Agents in the U.S. Property-Casualty Market
The United States' property and casualty insurance market had its birth in
marine underwriting, much like its London parent, and the roles and legal
relations of the various players in the marketplace were similarly derivative
of the London model.53 Locally based fire insurance companies were also
organized on a mutual-ownership basis in several seaboard cities during the
colonial period.54  When the American Revolution removed British
restrictions on the formation of joint stock companies, substantial
underwriting companies were organized for the first time in the new United
States, beginning with two marine insurance companies in Charleston,
South Carolina, chartered in 1776. With the formation of the Insurance
Company of North America in Philadelphia in 1794, a uniquely American
insurance marketplace-characterized by stock and mutual companies
dwarfing individual Lloyd's syndicates in size-began in earnest.55
At the same time, the United States was expanding at a rapid pace in both
geography and population. The large new insurers in cities such as
Philadelphia and Hartford needed a mechanism to do business across
distances that dwarfed not only the City of London, but all of England. The
Lloyd's agency system, modified to the American setting, provided the
solution. While insurance intermediaries acting as true brokers-that is,
49. See generally Raphael, supra note 3, at 37-46.
50. Id. at 45, 64-65.
51. Id. at 27.
52. Id. Eventually, Lloyd's extended its delegation of authority to some agents to
include underwriting, or "binding," authority. See, e.g., Lloyd's Binding Authority
Registration, http://www.lloyds.com/lloyds-market/marketparticipants/coverholders/
bindingauthorityregistrationBAR (last visited Mar. 2, 2006).
53. Robert J. Gibbons et al., Insurance Perspectives 12-14 (1992).
54. Id. at 14-15.
55. Id. at 13.
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representing insurance purchasers-remained the rule in traditional
maritime insurance markets such as New York and San Francisco,
elsewhere in the United States a new model predominated, with
intermediaries contracting to represent the interests of one or more
insurance companies in marketing their products. 56 Ultimately, the two
most common types of insurance intermediaries in the United States were
"exclusive agents," who were employed by and represented only one
insurer, and "independent agents," who represented multiple insurers. 57
Because the latter distribution model required a departure from traditional
principles of agency law, particularly in the area of ownership of customer
information and renewal rights, the independent agency system developed a
formalized set of legal rules known as the American Agency System.58
Notwithstanding the historical, geographical, and conceptual distinctions
between brokers and independent agents, however, the legal distinction
between the two has grown imprecise in recent decades. Indeed, one can
hardly locate an in-depth legal analysis of the broker-agent distinction that
does not feature words such as "blurry" or "cloudy." 59  Some states no
longer even recognize multiple species of insurance intermediaries,
denominating all intermediaries simply as "agents" or "producers" (this is
the case, for example, in Connecticut); other states, including major
insurance markets such as New York and California, continue to recognize
two separate species of intermediaries. 60 In a similar vein, some courts and
commentators have simply given up, conflating brokers and independent
agents for analytical purposes. 61 Even in jurisdictions where brokers and
independent agents have largely been viewed as synonymous, however,
56. See Deborah S. Freeman & Celia Eggert, Exploration of Policyholder Information
Ownership Rights Under the Three Existing Insurance Agency Systems in the United States,
23 W. New Eng. L. Rev. 409, 411-16 (2002).
57. Id. at413-19.
58. Id. at 415; see In re Roy A. Dart Ins. Agency, Inc., 5 B.R. 207, 209-10 (Bankr. D.
Mass. 1980); In re Estate of Coming, II, 488 N.Y.S.2d 477, 481-82 (App. Div. 1985); see
also Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co. v. Comm'r of Ins., 491 N.E.2d 1061, 1063 (Mass. 1986)
(distinguishing the "Exclusive Agency System" from the "American Agency System").
59. See, e.g., IRMI, supra note 14, at XV.C. 1 (noting that "the distinctions between the
legal duties owed by agents and brokers have, in recent years, become blurred"); Colin
Sammon, Comment, Insurance Agent and Broker Liability: Crossing the Two Way Street,
29 Ohio N.U. L. Rev. 237, 238 (2002) ("In many states, the distinction between 'agent' and
'broker' is at best a cloudy one.").
60. See Appleman, supra note 14, § 47.6, at 338.
61. See, e.g., Douglas R. Richmond, Insurance Agent and Broker Liability, 40 Tort Trial
& Ins. Prac. L.J. 1, 5 (2004) ("Brokers are sometimes referred to as independent agents and
are generally considered to be the insured's agent." (citations omitted)). Richmond later
qualifies this view, observing that "brokers" (as he defines them) may enter into "agency
relationships" with insurance carriers and thus become "dual agent[s] for both the insured
and the insurer. Specifically, a broker may be an agent of the insured for purposes of
obtaining coverage and an agent of the insurer for other purposes." Id. at 7 (footnote
omitted). Richmond's struggle will be familiar to anyone who has tried to survey the precise
contours of the broker-agent distinction.
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questions remain as to the precise legal status of such producers under
agency law, 62 and to the scope of their legal duties to customers.
Legal distinctions aside, from a practical standpoint, it is generally
recognized that brokers are most often used by large commercial customers,
while smaller businesses and individuals purchase the bulk of their
insurance through agents, either captive or independent.63  Thus, in
economic-if not in legal-terms, the insurance market is fairly clearly
stratified. In fact, the two segments of the market have substantially
different characteristics, the former tending toward oligopoly since the large
broker consolidations of the 1990s64 and the latter more resembling the
"perfect competition" of economics textbooks with numerous firms
contesting for relatively tiny slivers of the market. 65 We should not be
surprised to discover that compensation mechanisms that are benign in the
competitive agency market might be abused in the less competitive
brokerage sector.
Some state regulators have been slow in recognizing the broker-agent
distinction in the wake of the Spitzer Investigation, whose focus on the
largest intermediaries, which conduct the bulk of their business as brokers
(and in major historical "broker markets" like New York and San
Francisco), obscured that issue for a time. As regulators outside New York
begin to investigate second-tier insurance intermediaries, however, their
efforts are being complicated by the fact that these intermediaries carry on a
substantial portion of their business as independent agents, contractually
bound to pursue the interests of their appointing carriers. 66 Indeed, in the
first Spitzer Investigation-related complaint against an intermediary that
explicitly addressed the broker-agent distinction, Connecticut's Attorney
General, Richard Blumenthal, abandoned the breach of fiduciary duty thrust
of Attorney General Spitzer's complaints (and his own) against Marsh,
Aon, and Willis, presumably because the firm in question, Hilb Rogal &
Hobbs, conducts the overwhelming majority of its business as an
independent agent.67 Instead, Attorney General Blumenthal alleged that the
firm had violated Connecticut's unfair trade practices statutes by claiming
to represent the interests of insureds despite its agency relationships with
insurers.68
62. See, e.g., Mate v. Wolverine Mut. Ins. Co., 592 N.W.2d 379, 386 (Mich. Ct. App.
1998) ("'Because brokers receive compensation from the insurers, it seems evident that a
persuasive argument can be made for not treating a broker as an agent of the insurance
purchaser."' (quoting Robert E. Keeton & Alan I. Widiss, Insurance Law, A Guide to
Fundamental Principles, Legal Doctrines, and Commercial Practices §2.5b(3), at 83-84
(1988))).
63. Cummins & Doherty, supra note 11, at 6-7.
64. Id. at 9.
65. Id. at 7-13.
66. See Complaint 4-15, Connecticut v. Hilb Rogal & Hobbs Co. (Conn. Super. Ct.
Aug. 31, 2005), available at http://www.ct.gov/ag/lib/ag/consumers/hrhcomplaint.pdf
[hereinafter Hilb Rogal Complaint].
67. Id 16.
68. Id. 16-22, 102-09.
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So, while there may be some question as to the precise legal borders of
the broker-agent distinction, it remains an important factor to be considered
in assessing the appropriate response to the revelations of the Spitzer
Investigation and its progeny.
B. The Uses and Abuses of Contingent Commissions
Insurance intermediaries are compensated in various ways for their work.
In most cases, producers are compensated by the insurance carrier on a
commission basis, although large corporate insurance buyers sometimes
choose to compensate their brokers directly on a fee basis. 69 Commission-
based compensation comes in two primary forms. The first is "standard
commission" which is calculated as a percentage of the policy premium
(typically ranging from five percent to twenty percent) and deducted by the
producer from the customer's premium payment before it is remitted to the
carrier. The second is "contingent commission," which is calculated as a
percentage of a producer's entire book of business with a particular carrier
(normally ranging from one percent to two percent) and paid by the carrier
at year end based on the producer's meeting overall production and
profitability goals.70 Contingent commissions have been used by insurers
as an incentive mechanism for their agents for a century or more. 71
Although contingent commissions have come under attack in recent
months, their persistence can be attributed to substantial advantages they
provide to insurers, intermediaries, and even consumers. But if, as I will
argue, contingent compensation is the most efficient (e.g., low cost) means
of promoting effective distribution of insurance products, 72 what risks does
it pose and how can they be addressed?
To begin at the beginning, the affinity of insurers for contingent
commissions as a mechanism for compensating producers is easy to grasp.
It should resonate with anyone familiar with distributing products through
69. See Cummins & Doherty, supra note 11, at 14-16.
70. Id. at 14-15.
71. See, e.g., Miss. Home Ins. Co. v. Adams & Boyle, 106 S.W. 209 (1907) (suit by an
agent against a carrier to recover profit-based contingent commissions); Thompson v.
Frelinghuysen, 191 I11. App. 204 (1915) (suit by an agent of a brokerage firm to recover
profit-based contingent commissions); W. Grain Dealers' Mut. Fire Ins. Co. v. Garrison Ins.
Agency, 33 P.2d 950 (Kan. 1934) (holding that an agreement between an insurance agent
and carrier provided for profit-based contingent commissions); Birdsall-Friedman Co. v.
Globe & Rutgers Ins. Co., 190 A. 924 (Pa. 1937) (involving a profit-based contingent
commission agreement). As early as 1951, the California Insurance Commissioner
promulgated instructions to insurers with respect to their reporting in statutory filings of
amounts of contingent commissions paid to agents. See Cal. Ins. Bulletin No. 113 (May 13,
1951).
72. Given that no fair observer can question that the P&C insurance market is, on the
whole, a highly competitive one, it is fair to assume that compensation structures in the
industry reflect perceived overall economies and a rational division of costs and benefits
among the parties to insurance transactions. See, e.g., Laureen Regan & Sharon Tennyson,
Agent Discretion and the Choice of Insurance Marketing System, 39 J. Law & Econ. 637,
638 (1996) (noting that "different insurance marketing organizations arise as a means to
minimize the costs of correctly matching policyholder risks with insurance coverage").
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intermediaries, whether Oreos sold at Wal-Mart or Thin Mints sold by your
friendly neighborhood Girl Scout. Simply put, distributors large and small
will sell more of a particular product if they have incentives to do so, be
those incentives volume bonuses or merit badges. In the case of
commodities (i.e., fungible goods or services), the relative level of sales
incentives may entirely dictate the focus of the distributor's energies
between one similar product and another.
Insurance is, despite the best efforts of carriers to distinguish their
products in the marketplace, substantially commoditized. Standard
commissions, while variable and therefore susceptible to use as a sales
incentive, are a blunt instrument and have no motivating effect beyond a
single transaction. Moreover, standard commissions offered by one carrier
in the context of a particular transaction will commonly be matched by one
or more competitors eager to write the same account. Even if all
competitors do not agree to pay higher commissions on any one transaction,
the net effect of this type of competition over time is to increase
commissions and, ultimately, the premiums paid by consumers above an
optimum level. (And, of course, differential standard commissions have the
same potential to induce producers to "steer" business to higher-paying
insurers as contingents-a simple point, but one that has been largely
overlooked in the debate over contingent compensation.) Contingent
commissions, on the other hand, allow each carrier to compensate its
producers on the basis of overall sales performance, fine-tuning the
incentives it provides to its business strategy. While such compensation
can also be the subject of "bidding up" by competing carriers, an
independent agent or broker needs to maintain multiple sources of
insurance capacity so it cannot leverage the "highest bidding" insurer on a
book-of-business basis as it can in the context of a single transaction.
As importantly, typical contingent commission arrangements reward the
intermediary not just for the volume of business produced, but for the
profitability of that business. Although profit-based commissions have
been used in the industry for many years, carriers have become steadily
more committed to including this factor in their contingent compensation
arrangements. Profitability is an important element in an effective incentive
program because it puts the producer's "skin in the game," enlisting the
agent or broker in the effort to identify customers that are less likely to
incur insured losses. Such an alignment of interests has benefits for
consumers, as well as providers, of insurance, as I discuss below. At a
minimum, such profit sharing provides a disincentive for the producer to
attain its sales goals by loading up the carrier with substandard risks. 73
73. Given insurers' strong interest in linking producer compensation to profitability,
Marsh's success in the late 1990s in eliminating profitability as an element in its contingent
compensation through the device of the PSA speaks volumes about the relative bargaining
power of that mega-broker and the many competing insurers for which it places business. J.
David Cummins and Neil A. Doherty, in their recent study of the economics of insurance
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Interestingly, given the financial stakes involved, there has been little
independent research indicating that contingent commissions are effective
in influencing producer behavior. The mere fact that this device has been
so widely adopted by insurers over the past century is probably proof
enough of its efficacy, however. 74 The one academic study of the topic, by
an MIT doctoral candidate named Jeffrey Wilder, found that contingent
commissions do indeed influence the behavior of individual producers who
are aware of them (i.e., equity owners in an insurance agency). 75 Wilder
also noted that contingent commissions can theoretically influence the
behavior of nonowner producers as well, if an agency creates internal
incentives for them in support of the firm's goals. 76
If the appeal of contingent commissions to insurance carriers is fairly
clear, why has this form of compensation been embraced by the producers
themselves? Why would they not simply insist on higher standard
commissions on the front end and eliminate the risk that bad results on their
placements would reduce their compensation? The simplest answer to this
question is that insurance agents and brokers need access to insurance
carriers as much as the carriers need access to customers, and the market for
insurance placement services remains more than competitive enough to
prevent individual intermediaries from exacting standard commissions
equivalent to what carriers are willing to pay on a contingent basis to their
most successful producers. 77
There is perhaps another, more subtle, reason that contingent
commissions have developed as a compensation technique distinct from
standard commissions, a reason having to do with the internal economics of
insurance agencies. Most individual insurance agents or brokers are
employees of their firms, with little or no equity stake in the business. They
do, however, "own" their books of business to a large extent, giving
successful agents considerable bargaining power vis-A-vis their employers.
Insurance brokerage is an "eat what you kill" business, meaning that the
bulk of an individual agent's compensation is based on a percentage of the
intermediaries, note the potential for abuse in volume-only contingent commission
arrangements. Cummins & Doherty, supra note 11, at 16-18.
74. At a more fundamental level, Laureen Regan and Sharon Tennyson have
demonstrated that insurers will gravitate to independent agent and broker distribution, as
opposed to direct sales or captive agent distribution, for more complex products where the
intermediary's superior access to information concerning the risk will produce improvements
in underwriting results outweighing any increased compensation costs involved. See Regan
& Tennyson, supra note 72, at 646-47.
75. Jeffrey Wilder, Competing for the Effort of a Common Agent: Contingency Fees in
Commercial Insurance 21 (U.S. Dep't of Justice Antitrust Div. Econ. Analysis Group,
Working Paper No. EAG03-4, 2004), available at
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstractid=418061. An earlier version of Wilder's
paper was cited in the WLF's February 10, 2004, letter that was the initial catalyst of the
Spitzer Investigation. WLF Letter, supra note 7, at 2.
76. Wilder, supra note 75, at 21.
77. See generally Cummins & Doherty, supra note 11, at 10-13.
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standard commission income she brings into the firm. 78 Accordingly, an
agency principal would have a strong incentive to reduce the firm's
standard commission income if such income could be replaced with
revenue that was less visible to employee agents-like year-end contingent
commission payments calculated as a percentage of the firm's entire book
of business. Indeed, it may be that efforts to preserve the confidentiality of
contingent commission arrangements have had less to do with keeping such
information from an insurance agency's customers than they have with
keeping such information from the agency's own employees. While agency
owners are understandably reluctant to concede this for the record, many
will state in private that contingent commissions provide a vital pool of
"house" money that funds the basic overhead of their firms. Off the record,
many principals of smaller agencies question whether they could remain in
business without contingent compensation reserved to the firm.79 Such
compensation also provides an incentive for an insurance agency to guard
its firm-wide reputation for ethical conduct (without which it is likely to
lose agency appointments from carriers), and should therefore improve
oversight of individual producer's sales practices.
The potentially cataclysmic impact on the level of competition in the
market for insurance intermediation services of an outright ban on
contingent commissions has gone largely unnoted in the debate spawned by
the Spitzer Investigation. It may well be, however, that Attorney General
Spitzer's concession at the National Press Club that contingent
commissions can be appropriate in some circumstances indicates that he
understands this risk.
But what of the customers? Are the interests of insurance consumers
prejudiced by contingent compensation agreements between insurers and
intermediaries? Attorney General Spitzer and others have alleged that such
compensation artificially raises the price of insurance, as opposed to
reflecting its true costs. It is not at all clear, however, that this is the case.
To the contrary, a strong case can be made that independent intermediaries
compensated in part based on the performance of their overall books of
business with individual insurance carriers are the most efficient
distribution mechanism for complex insurance products.80  Further,
contingent commissions may generate benefits to insureds-in terms of the
"exposure cost" (that is, the risk-based premium net of expenses) and
availability of coverage-in addition to reducing the transaction costs of the
insurance purchase.
From the standpoint of basic economics, the mere durability of the
independent broker or agent distribution model as a feature of the market
for certain kinds of insurance products argues for its efficiency.
78. See Wilder, supra note 75, at 7-8.
79. See, e.g., Phil Zinkewicz, Agents Being Swept into the Scandal, Rough Notes, Dec.
2004, at 84, 84-86.
80. See, e.g., Cummins & Doherty, supra note 11, at 17-18; Regan & Tennyson, supra
note 72, at 645-46.
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Notwithstanding market distortions such as Attorney General Spitzer
apparently discovered in the Excess Casualty area at Marsh, the broader
P&C insurance market is unquestionably a truly competitive one, with low
barriers to entry and an array of available distribution channels all but
guaranteeing that consumers will in most circumstances have access to a
desired mix of insurance products and services at costs free of what
economists refer to as "monopoly rents." 81 Indeed, Laureen Regan and
Sharon Tennyson have demonstrated that insurers will gravitate to lower
cost distribution structures such as direct sales or captive agents in lines
where underwriting is relatively generic and claims costs more predictable
(e.g., personal lines coverages such as auto), that is, where they can
compete for profitable business without incurring, and passing on to the
consumer in whole or in part, the higher costs of an independent
intermediary. 82  And, if the P&C insurance market is fundamentally
competitive, then consumers must benefit from the efforts of providers and
intermediaries to achieve competitive advantage in terms of cost and other
factors. At a minimum, therefore, the current independent producer
marketing organization is due a presumption of economic legitimacy.
With specific regard to profit-based contingent commissions, some
consumers (specifically, good risks) will also benefit from lower prices
because such commissions provide an incentive for producers to provide
sufficient information to the carrier to overcome its concern with the
problem of "adverse selection," which arises because an insured inevitably
knows more about its true risks than the insurance carrier. As J. David
Cummins and Neil A. Doherty have observed,
Insofar as the insurer is unable to differentiate risks, it may try to charge
uniform premiums to good (low) risks and bad (high) risks alike. Thus,
the good risks will end up subsidizing the bad. This implies that bad risk
81. See Cummins & Doherty, supra note 11, at 7-14. It may be argued that this view of
the insurance market is overly simplistic, and in particular that the market for insurance
intermediation services demonstrably has sectors that are less than perfectly competitive.
This argument is probably strongest with respect to two sectors at the extremes of the
commercial P&C market: commercial insurance for large corporations on the one hand and
personal lines insurance for middle-income families on the other. The former sector sees
limits on competition for brokerage business because the enormous resource requirements of
large commercial can only be met by a small number of large firms. At the smaller end of
the spectrum, competition may be limited in practical terms by the reluctance of consumers
to "shop" their business from one agent to another for reasons of loyalty or simple aversion
to change. While such arguments cannot be dismissed out of hand, I would argue that even
in these sectors, aggressive competition does occur-whether in the form of Aon proposing
alternative programs to Marsh clients in the Fortune 500 or a direct marketer of personal
auto insurance sending an unsolicited rate quote to an individual consumer. Thus, even if
buyers of insurance in some quarters, large and small, show reluctance to change
intermediaries frequently, they nonetheless have access to market information enabling them
to assess whether they are getting a "good deal" through their chosen intermediary.
82. See Regan & Tennyson, supra note 72, at 645-46. Cummins's and Doherty's
research indicates that producer compensation is passed through to consumers in increased
prices, but not fully, so insurers retain an economic interest in achieving the lowest priced
distribution model that will produce a sustainable book of business, as of course, do
consumers. See Cummins & Doherty, supra note 11, at 19-21.
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policyholders will find insurance very attractive and will demand
considerable insurance, but the demand for insurance by good risks will
be light and might disappear altogether. Thus, asymmetric information
"crowds out" the good risks, and insurance is only fairly priced for the
bad risks. The insurance market ends up with an adverse selection
problem, with the insured population representing primarily the higher
risk clients. The costs of adverse selection fall on policyholders,
particularly the good risks, who may have to pay excessive rates or accept
diminished coverage. Insurers recognize the problems caused by lack of
information, and this is reflected in the prices and coverage they offer.
But, if adverse selection can be avoided, policyholders will be better
off.83
Thus, contingent compensation arrangements that provide incentives to
producers to assist in overcoming the adverse selection problem will benefit
policyholders by encouraging insurers to price good risks more
competitively. Transaction costs can also be lowered through this device,
because the costs of an independent agent's or broker's vetting of a risk are
in the aggregate spread among a number of carriers to which it might
submit business. Finally, profit-based contingents give producers a
significant incentive to provide their clients with loss control services after
they have sold a policy-and help fund such services.
Contingent commissions should arguably be preferred over standard
commissions by consumers for another reason: Higher up-front
commissions encourage a short-term focus by producers, reducing their
reluctance to place business with markets irrespective of their long-term
prospects. Such a short-term focus, and the periodic market contractions it
contributes to as marginal carriers fail, exacerbates the volatility of the
underwriting cycle and ultimately hurts consumers. 84  Contingent
commissions, on the other hand, give the producer a stake in making sure
that a carrier remains solvent and able to pay claims, as well as annual
performance awards to its producers.
Implicit in Attorney General Spitzer's critique of contingent
commissions, however, is a belief that-whatever market-proven
efficiencies they may represent and whatever benefits to consumers they
may provide-such compensation is a corrupting influence on producers
because of the temptations it provides to "steer" business in order to
maximize benefits to the producer as opposed to the customer. This
concern is not utterly unfounded, as no one would deny that producer
incentives are designed by carriers to attract business, but it overlooks one
fundamental fact. Insurance intermediaries are normally more concerned
with the risk of losing a good customer to a competing producer than they
83. Cummins & Doherty, supra note 11, at 25. Even contingent commissions based on
volume alone may have benefits for consumers, ranging from lowered costs achieved by
economies of scale within insurers to increased competition from new markets using such
commissions to gain market share. Id. at 17, 24.
84. Fitzpatrick, supra note 14, at 269-70.
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are with any marginal inducements that may be provided by any one
insurance carrier. 85  A typical agent or broker is therefore extremely
unlikely to act in such a way that it will risk losing a customer and the long-
term income stream it represents, whatever immediate benefit it might
derive in contingent compensation. 86 Even less compelling is the claim
made by some critics that profit-based contingent commissions will cause
producers to be less than aggressive in seeking payment for their client's
claims. 87 Anyone with practical experiences in the insurance business
knows that customers make lasting judgments about intermediaries and
insurers based on their behavior in the claims-paying context; the risk to
individual customer relationships and to the intermediary's reputation in the
marketplace would both militate strongly against a contingent commission-
induced effort to reduce claims collections. 88
If concems with endemic market manipulations driven by contingent
commission arrangements are largely unfounded, however, a belief that the
insurance market is fundamentally competitive has as its necessary
corollary the acknowledgement that greater transparency in producer
compensation would not alter the market's essential structure and
operations. This, in truth, is the challenge that has been thrown down by
Attorney General Spitzer: If the insurance market is efficient and serves
consumers well, what have its participants to fear from a little sunshine?
But before we explore the implications of this challenge, let us first
examine the early legislative and regulatory responses to Spitzer's
challenge.
III. LEGISLATIVE AND REGULATORY RESPONSES: THE SMALL LAWS
By mid-2005, the focus of regulatory debate on the implications of the
Spitzer Investigation had shifted from state attorneys general ("AGs") to
state legislators and insurance commissioners. This shift was not
attributable to any lack of continuing prosecutorial zeal on the part of state
AGs, as demonstrated by ongoing civil and criminal investigations on
multiple fronts, but instead reflected the real limitations of their power to
drive prospective market reform other than by consent agreements with
individual defendants. One can also speculate that state prosecutors have
been reluctant to attack the well-established institution of contingent
85. As noted above, I have explored the motivations of insurance producers and other
insurance market participants in more detail in an earlier work. See id. at 269 ("Whatever an
agent's or broker's legal relation to the underwriting carrier they are motivated, in practical
terms, by the fear that they will lose their customer to another agent or broker who can
deliver the same coverage at a lower price."). Of course, circumstances can exist-as they
appear to have existed in the Excess Casualty unit at Marsh Global Brokin--where
individual producers can be simultaneously insulated from the salutary effects of this fear
and motivated by other incentives. Such combinations of circumstances remain rare,
however.
86. See, e.g., Cummins & Doherty, supra note 11, at 23; Wilder, supra note 75, at 7.
87. See, e.g., Hunter, supra note 33.
88. See Cummins & Doherty, supra note 11, at 27-28.
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compensation for independent agents, as opposed to brokers, either because
they appreciate the risk of unintended harm to an important "Main Street"
business sector or because they fear alienating a powerful political
constituency.89
Legislative and administrative market reform efforts have targeted
disclosure of compensation received by insurance producers, as opposed to
proscribing contingent commissions themselves. Two organizations of
state insurance officials, the National Association of Insurance
Commissioners ("NAIC") and the National Counsel of Insurance
Legislators ("NCOIL"), have promulgated model producer disclosure
legislation in response to the Spitzer Investigation. The NAIC acted first, in
December 2004. The initial NAIC draft addressed producer disclosure at
two levels. Section A of the draft prohibited any producer that "receives
any compensation from the customer ... or represents the customer" in an
insurance placement from accepting compensation from the carrier unless
the customer has consented in writing and been informed of the amount of
such compensation.9" Section B of the original NAIC draft also contained a
"generic disclosure" provision, which provided that-irrespective of
whether a producer was being paid by or acting on behalf of the customer-
the producer must disclose to its customer that it will receive compensation
from the carrier writing the customer's policy, that such compensation
might vary from carrier to carrier, and that the producer might receive
compensation from the carrier based on aggregate performance of its book
of business with that carrier. 91 Ultimately, however, the NAIC adopted a
89. While not as numerous as lawyers, insurance agents are a substantial bloc in state
legislatures. Cf Peverill Squire, Legislative Professionalization and Membership Diversity in
State Legislatures, 17 Legis. Stud. Q. 69, 74-75 (1992).
90. In relevant part, Section A of the NAIC Model Act provides as follows:
A.(I) Where any insurance producer or any affiliate of such producer receives any
compensation from the customer for the placement of insurance or represents the
customer with respect to that placement, neither that producer nor the affiliate shall
accept or receive any compensation from an insurer or other third party for that
placement of insurance unless the customer has, prior to the customer's purchase
of insurance:
(a) Obtained the customer's documented acknowledgement that such
compensation will be received by the producer or affiliate; and
(b) Disclosed the amount of compensation from the insurer or other third party
for that placement. If the amount of compensation is not known at the time of
disclosure, the producer shall disclose the specific method for calculating such
compensation and, if possible, a reasonable estimate of such amount.
Proposed Compensation Disclosure Amendment to the Producer Licensing Model Act (Nat'l
Assoc. of Ins. Comm'rs 2004) [hereinafter NAIC Model Act], available at
http://www.naic.org/documents/committees ex-broker compdisclosure.pdf (version
adopted Dec. 29, 2004).
91. The deferred Section B provided, in pertinent part as follows:
B. An insurance producer must disclose the following, if applicable, to a customer,
prior to the purchase of insurance:
(1) That the producer will receive compensation from an insurer or other third
party for the sale;
(2) That the compensation received by the producer may differ depending upon
the product and insurer(s); and
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model disclosure provision that contained only Section A, and deferred
consideration of the broader requirement of draft Section B.
NCOIL took an even more conservative approach, adopting a model
disclosure law in March 2005 that requires a producer to obtain consent
from and disclose its compensation to the customer only where the producer
will be paid by both parties to the transaction. 92 In other words, the NCOIL
model did not include the alternative basis for requiring disclosure
contained in Section A of the NAIC model: that the producer "represents
the customer with respect to the placement." The NCOIL model also
limited its requirements to a customer's "initial" placement of insurance (as
opposed to renewals) and reduced the specificity required in disclosing
formula-based contingent compensation. 93
In the months since the NAIC and NCOIL models were issued, states that
have acted in this area have shown an almost uniform preference for the
NCOIL model. At this writing, a total of seven states have enacted new
producer disclosure laws; none has adopted the NAIC model outright and
only two have adopted requirements beyond those contained in the NCOIL
model. 94 Significantly, neither New York nor California has yet addressed
broker disclosure legislatively. New York seems unlikely to enact broad
insurance market reform legislatively. Indeed, notwithstanding New York
Attorney General Spitzer's attacks on contingent commissions in general,
(3) That the producer may receive additional compensation from an insurer or
other third party based upon other factors, such as premium volume placed with a
particular insurer and loss or claims experience.
NAIC Model Act, supra note 90, available at
http://www.naic.org/documents/comnmittees ex brokerBroker-subsecB.pdf (draft of Dec.
27, 2004).
92. The NCOIL Model Act provides, in pertinent part as follows:
A. Where any insurance producer or any affiliate of such producer receives any
compensation from the customer for the initial placement of insurance, neither that
producer nor the affiliate shall accept or receive any compensation from an insurer
or other third party for that placement of insurance unless the producer has, prior
to the customer's purchase of insurance:
(1) Obtained the customer's documented acknowledgement that such
compensation will be received by the producer or affiliate; and
(2) Provided a description of the method and factors utilized for calculating the
compensation to be received from the insurer or other third party for that
placement.
Producer Compensation Disclosure Model, Amendment to the Producer Licensing Model
Act (Nat'l Conference of Ins. Legislators 2005) [hereinafter NCOIL Model], available at
http://www.aba.com/aba/documents/abia!NCOILFinalMarkup.pdf
93. Id.
94. Connecticut, Georgia, Oregon, and Texas have enacted versions of the NCOIL
Model. Arkansas and Rhode Island have enacted similar legislation with an additional
requirement that all producers receiving compensation from the insurer disclose that fact.
Nevada's Division of Insurance has issued a temporary rule imposing substantial disclosure
requirements on brokers, but exempting agents, defined as those producers that are
"compensated by the insurer." State of Nev., Dep't of Bus. and Indus. Div. of Ins.,
Temporary Regulation Concerning Broker's Duties to Client: Duty Against Self-Dealing,
Duty to Disclose Compensation and Duty to Disclose All Quotes; Violations (Feb. 3, 2005),
available at http://doi.state.nv.us/Laws-REG-Temp-Broker-05.pdf.
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the state's insurance superintendent has said publicly that independent
agents, as opposed to large brokers, should be entitled to accept contingent
commissions. 95 California's insurance commissioner has taken a more
aggressive stance, proposing broad-based regulations imposing new duties
on insurance brokers and agents.96  There is a substantial question,
however, whether Commissioner John Garamendi has the statutory power
to impose such requirements under existing California law,9 7 and the
California legislature has thus far rebuffed his attempts to obtain such
authority through new legislation.
98
95. See Michael Ha, NY'S Mills Defends Fees for Independent Agents, Nat'l Underwriter
Apr. 29, 2005, http://www.nationalunderwriter.com/pandc/hotnews/viewPC.asp?article=
4 29 05 14 17204.xml&src=5.
96. See Press Release, Cal. Dep't of Ins., Insurance Commissioner John Garamendi
Unveils New Regulations in Ongoing Battle to Protect Consumers from Impact of Secret
Broker Commissions (Apr. 13, 2005), available at http://www.insurance.ca.gov/0400-
news/0 100-press-releases/0080-2005/releaseO39-05.cfm. Commissioner Garamendi's
proposals are by far the most far reaching seen to date. Specifically, Commissioner
Garamendi's proposed regulations would require the following:
Require the agent or broker to advise a client, prior to signing an agreement or
receiving a fee, whether the producer will seek a quote from one insurer or more
than one insurer.
Require the agent or broker to reveal if he or she is acting on behalf of the
insurer or the client in connection with the placement of insurance. A producer
who accepts a fee from a client is conclusively deemed to be acting on behalf of
the client.
Require the agent or broker to reveal the amount of compensation he or she will
receive if the client purchases insurance with any insurer recommended by the
agent or broker. If the amount of compensation cannot reasonably be known at the
time this disclosure is made, the producer may disclose the method by which any
such compensation will or may be calculated.
A broker or agent acting on behalf of the client, or who accepts a fee from the
client, may not accept any compensation from a third party for the transaction done
on behalf of the client without first obtaining the consent of the client.
A broker or agent who has told a client that he or she will search for the best
quote on a policy must reveal the number of quotes obtained, the name of the
insurer, the premium amount, and other required information.
Id. Commissioner Garamendi's April 2005 proposed regulations were less far reaching,
however, than provisions he proposed in October 2004 in the immediate aftermath of New
York Attorney General Spitzer's suit against Marsh. See, e.g., Lord, Bissell & Brook, Client
Alert, California Proposes Revamped Insurance Producer Disclosure Regulations (Apr. 22,
2005), http://www.lordbissell.com/Newsstand/2005-04_RevisedCABrokerRegsBarney.pdf.
As of this writing, Commissioner Garamendi has postponed issuing the regulation he
proposed in April 2005, citing a move toward voluntary disclosure of agency and
compensation arrangements being promoted by a leading producer trade group. See infra
note I10.
97. See State Fund's Policy May Set Precedent, Perhaps a Bad One, Workers' Comp
Executive, Sept. 15, 2005,
http://www.wcexec.com/vdata/5/n!12/everything/wce esv 05i14 015_article2.htm.
98. See News Release, Nat'l Ass'n of Mutual Ins. Cos., California Legislative
Committee Takes Correct Action on Producer Requirements (May 2, 2005),
http://www.namic.org/newsreleases05/050502nr1.asp. On September 30, 2005, the
California Department of Insurance again entered the mix, issuing an informal letter opinion
to "explain its legal position on the fiduciary duties of brokers and independent agents under
California law." Letter from Jon A. Tomashoff, Senior Staff Counsel, Cal. Dep't of Ins., to
Stephen Young, Esq., IBA West (Sept. 30, 2005) (on file with author). Not surprisingly, the
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Thus, a full year after Attorney General Spitzer shocked the insurance
world with his bid-rigging allegations against Marsh, the "business
reforms" settlements he has imposed on Marsh, Aon, and Willis remain the
most substantial new market regulation-in practical terms-yet effected.
Legislative responses thus far have been few, and those that have been
enacted are quite limited in scope. These "small laws" tell us something
about both the elected officials who enacted them and the public, which
thus far seems satisfied with them: that both understand (intuitively, at
least) that the market dysfunctions which gave rise to abuses at large global
insurance brokers like Marsh, Aon, and Willis have little relevance to the
independent insurance agent on Main Street, U.S.A., or to his customers.
But where does this leave us? How are we to resolve the very real issues
raised by the Spitzer Investigation about the opacity of the insurance market
to the consumers it serves? How are policyholders to be assured that their
intermediaries are properly managing the potential conflicts of interest
inherent in their function? Put in more prosaic terms, how and on what
basis is the Spitzer Investigation to be resolved? What terms of armistice
will be acceptable to the stakeholders in this controversy, be they
prosecutors, legislators, insurance intermediaries, carriers, or consumers?
In the next section, I outline one way to achieve such a concord: a simple
new "social contract" 99 for the P&C insurance market.
IV. A MODEST PROPOSAL: INSURANCE "IN THE SUNSHINE"
The foregoing has, I hope, demonstrated two things. First, the simplistic
invocation of loaded terms like "kickback" fails to capture the complexity
of the economic and legal relationships that have developed over centuries
in the insurance market, and one would disturb that edifice of relationships
at some risk to the interests of insurance consumers. Second,
notwithstanding the above observation, Attorney General Spitzer is on to
something: He has detected a reluctance in insurance practitioners to
disclose the details of producer compensation that would seem to belie the
industry's assertion that its prevailing distribution represents the best of all
Department's counsel asserts that both brokers and independent agents (when acting as "dual
agents" for both the carrier and the insured) owe fiduciary duties to customers, despite
California case law indicating that the producer-insured relationship is something less than a
fiduciary one. See, e.g., Hydro-Mill Co. v. Hayward, Tilton & Rolapp Ins. Assocs., 10 Cal.
Rptr. 3d 582 (Ct. App. 2004); Kotlar v. Hartford Fire Ins. Co., 100 Cal. Rptr. 2d 246 (Ct.
App. 2000).
99. Thomas Donaldson & Thomas W. Dunfee, Pr&is for Ties that Bind, 105 Bus. &
Soc'y Rev. 436, 442 (2000). Donaldson and Dunfee believe that
the same logic that sanctifies a handshake between two individuals turns out also
to sanctify the implicit understandings of economic communities woven
throughout the business world. These are the informal but critical agreements-or
"social contracts"-that provide the warp and woof of economic life. These are
the agreements that exist within industries, national economies, trade groups, and
corporations, and, further, that are the implicit "contracts" critical for
understanding business ethics.
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possible worlds for consumers. Given this reluctance, one could forgive the
Attorney General for thinking that the insurance industry "doth protest too
much" in reciting the economic case for contingent commissions. And,
while Spitzer has, through the medium of private settlements, largely cured
the market dysfunctions born of the excessive concentration of the
brokerage market for large corporate risks that occurred in the 1990s, he
plainly has lingering concerns about the rest of the P&C market. What,
then, would ease these concerns and bring an end to the Spitzer
Investigation and its progeny in other states?
Transparency, my friends, transparency: This is the sine qua non of a
peace treaty between Attorney General Spitzer and the insurance industry.
There are models aplenty of how this could be accomplished. Some U.S.
insurers have, for example, voluntarily placed information regarding their
producer compensation practices on their public web sites.100  This
approach has been endorsed by the largest organization of independent
agents, the Independent Insurance Agents & Brokers of America
("IIABA"), better known as the Big "I."101 But as helpful as disclosure by
insurers can be, most consumers' primary point of contact with the
insurance market will continue to be agents and brokers. Any legal duties
of disclosure that exist also reside in that relationship, as opposed to the
more remote relationship between insured and insurer. Should insurance
producers, in addition to carriers, be encouraged to disclose the basis of
their compensation?
Real estate agents and brokers, for example, have in recent years adapted
to a system in which a consumer cannot even be shown a property without
first deciding how the intermediary will be compensated and signing an
acknowledgement that the consumer understands who will pay the
intermediary and whose interests the intermediary represents. The real
estate industry is a particularly useful analog for purposes of considering
reform in the insurance market. An intermediary-driven market like
insurance, the real estate market has been regulated similarly over the past
century-with every U.S. state maintaining a "licensing statute or
regulatory scheme addressing qualifications for obtaining the necessary real
estate salesperson's or broker's license, and regulations governing realtors'
100. The most comprehensive such disclosure is The Chubb Corporation's, available at
http://www.chubb.com/marketing/chubb3887.html (last visited Apr. 17, 2006); the author
participated in the development of this disclosure. Other major carriers such as The
Hartford, available at
http://www.thehartford.com/servlet/Satellite?cid= 1122655319479&pagename=HIG/Page/Po
pUp&ntpageid=1 122655319479&ntsection=1 122655319479&c=Page (last visited Apr.
17, 2006), and St. Paul Travelers, available at
http://www.stpaultravelers.com/legal/producerCompDscl.html (last visited Apr. 17, 2006),
have also posted producer compensation disclosures.
101. Press Release, Indep. Agents & Brokers of Am., Big "I" Board Adopts Policy on
Insurance Company Disclosure (Sept. 23, 2005), available at
http://www.iiaa.org/eprise/main/CBWebsite/Affiliated/NationalAssociation/IIAA/02_News
/02 PressRelease/NA20050923143814.
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activities and conduct."102 Like today's insurance regulations, however,
traditional state realtor licensing statutes did not typically mandate
particular agency, compensation, or disclosure arrangements, which instead
developed primarily in response to the particular economics of the real
estate purchasing process.10 3
The real estate industry's wake-up call came in 1983, when a Federal
Trade Commission study found that seventy-two percent of all home buyers
believed, erroneously, that the "selling agent" assisting them was
representing their interests. 104  In fact, under long-established industry
practices, such intermediaries were sub-agents of the seller of the property.
In the ensuing decades, most states responded by mandating disclosure to
consumers of such agency relationships. 105 Many states themselves provide
consumers with information on real estate agency relationships. 10 6 One
feature of virtually all such disclosure regimes is the acknowledgment of
"dual agency": That is, an intermediary may act for both sides to a real
estate transaction so long as this dual agency is disclosed. 10 7
Such disclosures as are now mandated in the real estate industry have the
benefit of being simple and not providing so much information as to be
useless to consumers in practical terms.' 08 For example, one real estate
102. Ann Morales Olazdbal, Redefining Realtor Relationships and Responsibilities: The
Failure of State Regulatory Responses, 40 Harv. J. on Legis. 65, 70 (2003).
103. Id. at 71 ("State licensing statutes did not, however, dictate the form of agency
representation then prevalent. Instead, the entrenchment of the listing/cooperating or
'traditional' agency representation model was a direct result of the multiple listing systems
in use nationwide.").
104. L.A. Reg'l Off., Fed. Trade Comm'n, Residential Real Estate Brokerage Industry 1,
69 (1983). In what perhaps should stand as an object lesson to the insurance industry, the
real estate industry did not immediately embrace changes to the traditional market models
proposed in the wake of the 1983 Federal Trade Commission study. Indeed, it was not until
1992 that the National Association of Realtors ("NAR"), under political pressure from
consumer groups and economic pressure from a new sector of "exclusive buyer's agents,"
agreed to eliminate the requirement that agents accessing its regional and local multiple
listing services be subagents of sellers. Olazdibal, supra note 102, at 74-75. This voluntary
reform recognized, perhaps belatedly, that change in the real estate market was inevitable,
and allowed the NAR to retain the initiative in guiding the evolution of real estate market
practices.
105. See Craig W. Dallon, Theories of Real Estate Broker Liability and the Effect of the
'As Is' Clause, 54 Fla. L. Rev. 395, 416-18 (2002).
106. See, e.g., N.Y. State Dep't of State, Div. of Licensing Servs., Disclosure Regarding
Real Estate Agency Relationships (2001), available at
http://www.dos.state.ny.us/lcns/pdfs/dos1565.pdf, State of Cal. Dep't of Real Estate,
Disclosures in Real Property Transactions (1999), available at
http://www.dre.ca.gov/disclosures.htm#agency.
107. Olazdbal, supra note 102, at 79.
108. The "privacy policy" disclosures required of financial institutions by the Gramm-
Leach-Bliley Act of 1999, 15 U.S.C. 6801-6809 (2000), come to mind as an example of
disclosure "overkill." Does any appreciable portion of the consuming public actually read
these impenetrable missives? There are, of course, commentators who believe that current
real estate disclosures are insufficient, as there would no doubt be those who make the same
critique of my proposed insurance producer disclosure. Interestingly, however, the
complaint lodged against current realtor disclosures is that they are too complex to be
understood by unsophisticated homebuyers, not that they are too simple. See, e.g., Olazdbal,
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firm in my state, Connecticut, provides its customers with a simple
"Consumer Information Statement of Real Estate Relationships" that
outlines the various ways in which an intermediary can participate in a
transaction:
1. AS A SELLER'S AGENT... I AS A LICENSEE, REPRESENT
THE SELLER AND ALL MATERIAL INFORMATION SUPPLIED TO
ME BY THE BUYER WILL BE TOLD TO THE SELLER.
2. AS A BUYER'S AGENT, I... REPRESENT THE BUYER AND
ALL MATERIAL INFORMATION SUPPLIED TO ME BY THE
SELLER WILL BE TOLD TO THE BUYER.
3. AS A DISCLOSED DUAL AGENT, I... REPRESENT BOTH
PARTIES. HOWEVER, I MAY NOT, WITHOUT EXPRESS
PERMISSION, DISCLOSE THAT THE SELLER WILL ACCEPT A
PRICE LESS THAN THE LISTING PRICE OR THAT THE BUYER
WILL PAY A PRICE GREATER THAN THE OFFERED PRICE. 109
This disclosure is brief, straightforward, and gives the client the option of
choosing how he or she wishes to work with the intermediary. It is simple
enough to be understood by an unsophisticated purchaser of real estate,
while being sufficient to initiate a more far-reaching dialogue with even the
most sophisticated.
I suspect that Mr. Spitzer and his colleagues in state AGs' and insurance
commissioners' offices around the country would consider themselves to
have achieved substantial market reform, perhaps to the point of resolving
their broader concerns over producer compensation, if the Big "I" and other
independent producers' organizations would propose-and their members
would voluntarily adopt-a disclosure form for new customers that sets out
the basic facts of the intermediary's agency relationships. Such a disclosure
might look like this:
OUR FIRM HAS AGENCY CONTRACTS WITH THE FOLLOWING
INSURANCE COMPANIES:
IF YOU CHOOSE, OUR FIRM WILL ACT AS A "DUAL AGENT,"
REPRESENTING BOTH YOU AND THE INSURERS WHO HAVE
APPOINTED US, IN YOUR INSURANCE PURCHASE. IF WE ACT
AS A "DUAL AGENT," WE WILL BE COMPENSATED ON A
COMMISSION BASIS, WITH OUR COMMISSION BEING
INCLUDED IN YOUR POLICY PREMIUM AND PAID BY THE
INSURER YOU SELECT. WE MAY ALSO BE ELIGIBLE TO
RECEIVE ADDITIONAL COMPENSATION FROM THAT INSURER
BASED ON THE OVERALL VOLUME AND PROFITABILITY OF
THE POLICIES WE WRITE WITH THAT INSURER.
supra note 102, at 123-24. This criticism in itself would seem to support the idea that a
simple, high-level approach to disclosure will benefit the greatest number of consumers.
109. Fairfield County Homes, Connecticut Consumer Statement on Real Estate
Relationships (2005), available at
http://www.fairfieldcountyhomes.info/ConsumerStatementonRealEstateRelationships.
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INFORMATION ABOUT SUCH ADDITIONAL COMPENSATION
FOR WHICH OUR FIRM MAY BE ELIGIBLE CAN BE FOUND ON
OUR WEB SITE, AND IS ALSO PROVIDED BY THE INSURERS WE
REPRESENT ON THEIR WEB SITES.
IF YOU CHOOSE, WE WILL REPRESENT YOUR INTERESTS
EXCLUSIVELY AS A "BROKER" IN YOUR INSURANCE
PURCHASE. IF WE ACT AS YOUR "BROKER," WE WILL BE
COMPENSATED BY YOU, WITH OUR FEE TO BE DETERMINED
ACCORDING TO THE ATTACHED SCHEDULE, AND WE WILL
ACCEPT NO COMMISSION OR ADDITIONAL COMPENSATION
FROM AN INSURER IN CONNECTION WITH YOUR PURCHASE.
Adoption of a disclosure form along these lines would probably change
few consumers' approach to purchasing insurance; most would presumably
prefer to trade on a commission basis, just as most home buyers continue to
purchase real estate through agents compensated by the seller. Such an
approach would add little extra time or inconvenience to the insurance
purchasing process, and any new costs imposed would be de minimis. No
complex calculations would be necessary; no estimates of contingent
payments due, if at all, only after a review of an entire year's performance,
would be required. Most importantly, this reform would preserve important
mechanisms by which insurance carriers and their appointed agents have
sought for a century or more to align their interests and control their costs,
while respecting the consumer's right to understand the fundamental legal
and economic relationships underlying his or her insurance purchase. " 0
Clearly, a voluntary solution along these lines would be preferable to the
ongoing costs in time, resources, and distraction of the ongoing insurance
market investigations. It would recognize the time-honored economic value
of the independent agency system, preserve its efficiencies, and remove the
cloud of suspicion raised by Attorney General Spitzer's discovery of real
abuses involving large brokerage firms whose control of a few niches of the
110. On October 20, 2005, the Insurance Brokers & Agents of the West ("IBA West"), a
leading producer trade group on the West Coast, issued to its members the IBA West Guide
to Compensation Disclosure. While not taking a formal position on disclosure by its
members of agency relationships and compensation structures, the Guide offers model
disclosure language in a variety of forms and identifies "considerations for members to
evaluate should they decide, in light of their own professional circumstances, to provide
more information to their customers." See IBA West, IBA West Guide to Compensation
Disclosure (2005), available at
http://www.ibawest.com/pdf/Articles/IBAWestDisclosureGuidel 10105Final.pdf, Letter
from Stanley Simpson, President, IBA West, to IBA West Members 2 (Oct. 20, 2005),
available at
http://www.ibawest.com/pdf/Articles/CompensationDisclosureCoverLetterGuide 110105.pdf.
Even this careful nod toward voluntary disclosure generated a ringing endorsement from
California Insurance Commissioner John Garamendi, who announced that, in light of the
issuance of the Guide he would hold off on issuing his proposed regulation imposing
additional duties on California producers. See supra note 96; see also Press Release, Cal.
Dep't of Ins., Insurance Commissioner John Garamendi Commends IBA West for Its Guide
to Agent-Broker Compensation Disclosure (Nov. 2, 2005), available at
http://www.insurance.ca.gov/0400-news/0 1 00-press-releases/0080-2005/release- I 00-05.cfm.
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insurance market grew to the point where normal checks (primarily fear of
competition) on an otherwise benign system of producer compensation
ceased to operate effectively. If adopted, the independent agency system,
and the insurers and consumers who rely upon it, could return to the
business of efficiently spreading society's risks for the benefit of all.
Sunshine, as Louis Brandeis observed, is the best disinfectant. "'
111. Louis D. Brandeis, Other People's Money and How the Bankers Use It 62 (National
Home Library Foundation ed. 1933).
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